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elecommunications has been one of the most
dynamic economic sectors in recent years. The
former public utility sector with natural monopoly
characteristics, which was typically under state own-
ership, has experienced dramatic changes with
regards to technical innovations as well as changing
market environments. Most countries have priva-
tised their state-owned companies and opened up
the market for competition. Due to bottlenecks in
the local loop which is the remaining portion of the
network with natural monopoly characteristics,
access to this infrastructure component has been set
under sector-specific regulation in most countries.
However, this has been done under differing frame-
work conditions in the respective countries.This arti-
cle gives a brief introduction to the various new tech-
nologies that have emerged recently and that are
now competing with the traditional infrastructure.
The resulting consequences for market characteris-
tics in selected countries in combination with the dif-
fering regulatory frameworks are subsequently
described and analysed.
The integration of telecommunication systems
The improved and standardised treatment of digital
media and their transmission has led to extensive
changes in business models in various industries
within a few years. Due to this, the utility from
accessibility and capacity of broadband internet has
steadily and simultaneously increased for suppliers
and consumers in many markets. The growing
importance of the distinct provision of the interme-
diary service of digital transmission was also fos-
tered by a tighter integration of the telecommunica-
tion industry itself, as internet service providers
started to “triple play”, offering integrated video,
voice and data product in one service offering.
Especially the growth of Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) and of television via Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) has accelerated the conver-
gence process in the telecommunication and broad-
casting market, leading to a deep integration of the
traditional public switched telecommunication net-
work (PSTN)1 with broadband internet. The origin
of this dynamic development during the last decade
lies in the digitalisation of media in the course of the
rapid diffusion of information technologies. This in
turn involved a process of digitalising all telecom-
munication networks, wire-based and wireless,
across OECD countries. Hence, the transformation
of all media,whether data,voice or picture,into data
packages before sending them over the digital infra-
structure to the receiver made it technically possible
to interchange information between networks and
platforms without any restrictions.
Thus from the consumers perspective the range of
services offered in telecommunication markets
today and the choice of accessibility to them has
become very complex. In addition, recent develop-
ments in information technologies make these ser-
vices attainable independently of the chosen access
technology.The key differentiation in the market for
internet access therefore remains in the technology-
specific bandwidth that determines the variety and
quality of consumed services. Consequently, the
complexity for the consumers arises particularly
from the choice of access technologies, such as DSL
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1 The Public Switched Telephone Network is the classical circuit
switched network, where for each telephone call an end-to-end
physical circuit between the calling party and the called party is
reserved. For the duration of the call this circuit is not available to
other users of the network.and cable in the fixed line segment or UMTS,Wi-Fi,
satellite or WiMAX in the wireless or fixed wireless
segment. This complexity also extends to the heart
of broadband internet architecture, the internet
backbone.
Moreover, the market structure itself has gone
through fundamental changes in all OECD countries
since the liberalisation of the telecommunication
sector. The principle of sending information “pack-
aged switched” over digital networks as in the case
of broadband internet fostered the liberalisation of
parts of the telecommunication network architec-
ture. While the internet backbone is predominantly
in possession of business, educational and govern-
mental institutions or offered by the incumbent
telecommunication operators, in the access or inter-
net service provision entry and competition have
fundamentally changed the traditional market struc-
ture. Thus, besides the direct competition between
service providers using one specific or a selection of
their own or leased access facilities, the variety of
new access facilities as described above and their
partial substitutability has led to a growing facility-
based competition.
As new digital platforms and the services provided
on them compete more and more with traditional
services provided over broadcasting networks or the
PSTN, these changes in technology and strategy can
be expected to have implications for policy and reg-
ulation in the future. The main task for regulatory
and competition authorities will be to monitor the
rapid and extensive changes in telecommunication
technologies and market structures in order to
ensure durable competition and the emergence of
new innovations. It also calls into question the exist-
ing logic in the regulatory framework for the tradi-
tional telecommunication and broadcasting market.
For example, entering the market for fixed broad-
band internet access always requires an agreement
on the bottleneck, the local loop, which is the “last
mile” from the consumer’s residence to the phone
company’s hub/central office, between the entrant
and the incumbent telecommunication (DSL) or
cable television (cable) operator.
In this context it has been hotly debated whether a
vertically integrated incumbent service and broad-
band infrastructure provider has to grant access to
all levels of bandwidth within its network architec-
ture to potential entrants,thus opening up the whole
market for competition,or only up to a certain level.
As the accessibility of basic broadband internet ser-
vice can be granted via innovative transmitting tech-
nologies to nearly all households in OECD countries
today, the range of the provided bandwidth varies
greatly between urban,rural and remote regions due
to high investment cost of the high-speed, next gen-
eration networks like vDSL. This is of particular
importance for the market as the range and quality
of services offered over the broadband internet
strongly depends on the bandwidth provided to the
individual subscriber, which in turn depends on the
technology used. The most prominent application
that requires a high speed infrastructure is the provi-
sion of high definition television in the video-on-
demand, free and pay TV segments. This again is a
source for further convergence and innovations,such
as interactive television in the broadcasting sector.
In addition, the growing interest in VoIP services in
recent years has induced regulators to examine if
these new voice services based on packed-switched
networks should be put under the regulatory
umbrella or not. As VoIP services are successfully
expanding today, they are already having positive
effects on competition in the voice market,thus low-
ering prices for consumers.The classification of VoIP
and its regulatory treatment is thus a key issue for
regulators today.In this context,it is apparent that in
order to give the consumers the choice to change
telecommunication operators, which is the basis for
competition, the regulatory framework has to con-
sider number portability and carrier selection for
VoIP services as well.
Beside this, traditional policy issues like fixed-to-
mobile interconnection, interconnection charges in
general, foreign ownership restrictions and the gen-
eral service obligations may be called into question
in the course of the growing integration of the
telecommunication industry.
The primary objective behind the policy reforms of
the European Commission was to open up the
telecommunication market to competition. In line
with that, the Commission issued a series of new
directives for telecommunication aimed at a har-
monisation of the policy framework within the mem-
ber states (see Afonso, 2006). However, comparing
the processes of liberalization and privatisation in
telecommunication markets across the EU during
the last decade both similarities and substantial dif-
ferences can be detected. Owing to technological
developments and the growing complexity of the
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market,it is difficult to evaluate the progress of mem-
ber states in transposing the directives set by the
Commission. Thus even between, on the one hand,
countries where liberalisation of telecommunication
took place around the same time and, on the other
hand, countries which do not exhibit fundamental
differences in political, economic or geographic
structure, the logic behind the regulatory framework
may still vary in some categories. In order to provide
a basis for discussions about the attitudes towards the
regulations of telecoms across the EU and the levels
of competition in the respective member states
archived so far, we try to highlight some key aspects
in market characteristics and regulatory institutions
of selected states.Other OECD countries outside the
EU are also taken into account to provide some use-
ful benchmarks for the process of liberalisation and
harmonisation within the EU.
Market characteristics
This section gives an overview of the market charac-
teristics with a focus on employment trends, produc-
tivity development, the competitive situation, and
current access conditions.For this purpose we used a
country sample including Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Employment and productivity
In general, employment in telecommunication ser-
vices in OECD countries has fallen from the levels
reached during the late 1990s with the exception of
mobile communications. Along the lines of this
employment decline, there have been rapid increas-
es in access paths and revenue per employee, which
are both measures of partial labour productivity.An
overview of this development is presented in
Table 1. Most countries under consideration, except
Canada and the UK, have experienced a significant
decline in employment, in particular after the New
Economy hype.
The most dramatic decline in employment has been
suffered by the Swedish telecommunications indus-
try. In most countries, this consolidation has been
accompanied by an almost constant increase in total
revenues, which resulted in strong (labour) produc-
tivity gains in the period 1999 to 2003. Productivity
gains can also be measured in terms of access paths
per employee.The number of fixed (or access) lines
is a quite common indicator of partial labour pro-
ductivity. Due to recent developments of new access
technologies, the broader notion of “access paths” is
used here.2 While the uses and capabilities of differ-
ent access paths obviously vary, their provision by
the carriers is indicative of the provider’s productiv-
ity. The rise in access paths per employee occurs
despite a fall in traditional fixed line PSTN connec-
tions in several countries, but ISDN and mobile
access paths as well as new means of broadband
access have experienced a rapid growth in the last
decade. Figure 1 depicts the percentage change of
Table 1  
Employment and labour productivity in the telecommunications sector
Australia Canada France Germany Sweden
United
Kingdom USA
1999 74,471 101,402 155,297 221,000 29,289 206,500 1,219,300
2000 76,000 103,692 154,522 241,000 30,340 230,300 1,323,400
2001 77,275 104,879 151,191 241,000 28,256 231,500 1,255,900




2003 67,750 110,834 137,414 226,000 18,825 242,000 1,060,000
1999 235 269 351 324 399 281 226
2000 265 290 413 408 431 326 228
2001 296 311 471 451 492 348 255
2002 321 319 500 489 708 334 292
Access paths
per employee
2003 393 309 551 527 810 362 321
1999 189,309 172,084 181,786 231,539 253,370 274,270 247,394
2000 192,840 187,054 175,938 213,940 226,321 276,514 253,153
2001 173,179 193,157 193,659 221,918 226,545 284,319 278,553





(in current US$) 2003 207,179 204,940 285,089 313,215 495,350 344,157 336,792
 Source: OECD (2005).
2 An access path is the sum of all forms of access – including tradi-
tional fixed lines, mobile subscribers, ISDN channels (64 kbit/s
voice equivalents) and DSL broadband subscribers.employment and both partial labour productivity
measures (access paths and revenues per employee),
where Sweden is a striking outlier.
Substantial reductions in incumbent-carrier employ-
ee headcounts have been common in many countries,
usually accompanied by outsourcing activities (trans-
ferring non-core activities such as equipment mainte-
nance,operations and repairs to other companies).In
several cases employees were dismissed and re-
employed by the outsourcing companies at wage lev-
els consistent with those of the specific localities and
businesses. This has been a major driving force of
productivity improvements. Out-
sourcing activities also affect
productivity measures, such as
revenue per employee, which
should be kept in mind while
comparing countries.
The major driving force of these
developments can be seen in the
liberalization of the respective
telecommunications markets.
However, even if productivity
improvements are an intended
result of the liberalization,one of
the main objectives of liberalis-
ing a network industry is to intro-
duce competition and thereby to
alleviate the market power of the
incumbent carriers.This is neces-
sary from a welfare perspective
in order to impede monopoly
pricing,which implies (beside the
excessive price and a suboptimal
small quantity) several ineffi-
ciencies.For assessing the success
of the liberalization, it is there-
fore essential to review the level
and development of competition
and of service prices.
Competition and market power
It is primarily due to technical
innovations and improvements
that the natural monopoly char-
acteristics in the telecommunica-
tions markets have lost their
importance (except for the lo-
cal loop). Therefore facilities-
based competition can be seen
as a major driver of durable and effective competi-
tion in the overall telecommunications market.
Despite the number of operators in the fixed
telecommunications market, competition in some of
these markets has been relatively slow to develop.
This is particularly the case because of the lack of
facilities-based competition that can be measured by
the share of access lines by new entrants. Even if
Australia and the US exhibit relatively high growth
rates,the overall market share persists at a moderate
level, below 17 percent (see Figure 2). Both the UK
and the US were early starters in opening their mar-
kets to competition, which is reflected in the new
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entrants’ share of access lines in 2003 of 17 and
15 percent respectively. By contrast, the entrants’
market share in national long distance calls has risen
to a noticeable level above 30 percent in all countries
under consideration. In this case the new operators
are mainly service providers that offer services pri-
marily through third-party networks by leasing
capacity. Carrier selection and preselection have
played an important role in stimulating competition
in these markets.
A more qualitative evaluation of the competitive situ-
ation in the EU has been conducted by Dassler and
Parker (2004).They have questioned several regulato-
ry agencies in the EU, amongst others on the market
segments that were effectively competitive in the
respective countries as of December 2001.The French
authority responded that international and mobile
calls are competitive, the German authority referred
to only mobile calls and the Swedish authority
answered that no segments were effectively competi-
tive at that date (the British authority did not answer
this question). When asked whether the number of
operators (displayed in parentheses) is actually high
enough to achieve effective competition, the French
(107 licensed, non-licensed not published) and the
German (432) regulator agreed,the Swedish regulator
(145) was uncertain and the British regulator (95
licensed,non-licensed unknown) negated the question
and expressed favour for further market entry.Besides
this ambiguous picture, all regulators considered that
competition had actually led to lower charges, from
which consumers benefited. However, several regula-
tors mentioned the concern that consumers may not
necessarily benefit from more choice, as end users are
not always aware of the best deal. This problem of
incomplete information could
even be exacerbated by addition-
al market entry.
Another question in the survey
dealt with the interrelation of
competition between the quality
of transmission and customer
service. The results show that
transmission quality only im-
proved in the UK and in the
German mobile sector. Custom-
er service quality improved in all
countries apart from France,
where new entrants failed to
meet the quality expectations of
subscribers. Concerning the sep-
aration of services from the provision of networks
(also known as “unbundling”), most regulators were
sceptical or at least unsure about the advantages that
this might imply.Irrespective of this qualitative eval-
uation, Wallsten (2006) tested the interrelation of
local loop unbundling on broadband penetration
empirically in a cross-country panel dataset and
found no robustly significant impact.
Prices
A major task of competition – which is supposed to
be achieved or stimulated (or at least simulated) by
the regulation of network industries – is to provide
allocative efficiency and a maximum of social wel-
fare. Beside the market shares in different sub-mar-
kets, prices are also indicative of whether regulation
has succeeded in achieving this goal. The pricing of
telecommunication services in the current country
sample (and in the whole OECD area) has proven to
be very dynamic. Prices for most telecommunication
services have continued to fall, benefiting con-
sumers. Many operators have moved towards flat-
rate or unlimited calling and data plans. In addition,
competition from newer technologies such as VoIP
has contributed significantly to more competitive
rates for businesses and consumers.
The OECD (2005) has created several baskets to
compare residential telecommunication prices. The
so-called composite basket includes domestic ser-
vices, international services and calls from the fixed
network to mobile communication networks and
provides a comprehensive picture of the overall
telecommunication prices and country differences.



















































































Source: Own illustration based on OECD (2005).
 COMPOSITE BASKET OF RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE CHARGES
August 2004
US $ (PPP)
Figure 3divided in fixed and usage price components.
Sweden and the UK have the least expensive domes-
tic residential telecommunication services, when
measured in US dollars (using purchasing power
parity). Germany, Canada, and France are in the
midfield of this sample, but still significantly below
the OECD average.
VoIP has contributed significantly to more competi-
tive rates. In the US internet telephony companies
such as Vonage have emerged to compete with the
traditional PSTN network. Other companies such as
Skype, a peer-to-peer VoIP provider, compete even
in a multitude of countries. Skype provides a service
to any user with a broadband internet connection.
Across the OECD, Skype’s tariffs are on average
80 percent lower than the international tariffs for the
PSTN. The response from telecommunication carri-
ers is likely to be to offer competitive rates on their
own internet telephony service
or additional discounts on their
PSTN service to users with any
significant volume of calls.
In combination with VoIP, prices
for broadband access has become
a relevant measure for country
comparisons.Table 2 displays the
monthly charges for DSL-inter-
net access of the respective
incumbent providers as of
November 2004, with included
volume,additional costs and con-
nection speeds. Several factors
influence the respective price/
performance ratio. Seemingly
least expensive countries like
France and the UK provide only
low connection speeds. In
Germany and the UK, only limit-
ed data volume is included.
Australia performs worst in both
price and connection speed.
More recent developments show
that the dynamism of this mar-
ket segment is enormous and
that prices have fallen signifi-
cantly, with a simultaneous
increase of connection speed
and much more unlimited calling
and data-plan offerings.
Access conditions and penetration
Another important component to look at is the pen-
etration rate and access provision in several parts of
the telecommunications market. Figure 4 illustrates
the development of telecommunication channels
and of broadband access until 2003.
Along with the remarkable growth rates of broad-
band access, the absolute access numbers should
be seen in connection to the population.As a ratio
of 100 inhabitants,Canada had the best broadband
coverage (14.4) in 2003 followed by Sweden (10.7)
and the US (9.7). France (5.9), Germany (5.6), and
the UK (5.4) are in the midfield followed by
Australia (3.5). In terms of fixed network pene-
tration, as measured by channels, most count-
ries experienced a decline in 2003. On the other
hand, if mobile cellular subscribers are includ-
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Table 2 





















Australia 44.5 Unlimited - 256 64
Canada 40.6 Unlimited - 3,000 320
France 27.5 Unlimited - 512 128
Germany 28.5 1,500 0.020 1,024 128
Sweden 35.2 Unlimited - 512 400
United Kingdom 27.2 1,000 0.002 512 256
USA 30.0 Unlimited - 1,500 384
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ed, then access continues to expand across the
OECD.
Regulatory institutions and their tasks
The development of sector-specific regulation
In the past, telecommunications was regarded as
natural monopolies. Their control and regulation
was mostly performed by ministries. The US was
the only exception, which in 1934 had created an
independent institution – the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) – for the oversight
of interstate and international communications.3 In
the other countries considered in this article,sector-
specific regulation and the foundation of national
regulatory authorities (NRAs) were closely linked
to the opening of the telecommunication markets
to competition. Canada established the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Com-
mission (CRTC) in 1976, the UK established Oftel
in 1984, Austel was founded in Australia in 1991,
Post och Telestyrelsen (PTS) was set up in Sweden
in 1992, the Autorité de Régulation des Télé-
communications (ART) was established 1997 in
France, and Germany followed in 1998 with the
foundation of the Regulierungsbehörde für Tele-
kommunikation und Post (RegTP).
Sector-specific regulation is often seen as a tempo-
rary exemption from general competition law so
long as no effective competition in the sector exists.
With the development of competition the need for
sector-specific regulation is regarded as unnecessary
and competition control in the sector is transferred
to competition authorities. Competition authorities
have varying responsibilities in the regulatory
process of the selected countries. In some cases, reg-
ulatory powers stayed within the ministries. Since
their establishment, several of the selected NRAs
have changed their names and their fields of respon-
sibility:Austel changed to ACA and then to ACMA,
Oftel became OfCom,ART changed to ARCEP and
RegTP to Bundesnetzagentur.
This brief overview of different country models will
first describe the differences in the institutionalisation
of sector-specific regulation regarding reporting
obligations, financing, the appointment of members
and the possibility to overturn decisions of the NRA.
Then we will outline the other institutions formally or
informally implied in the process and their co-opera-
tion with the NRA against the background of select-
ed regulatory tasks: market entry, interconnection of
networks, spectrum management, numbering and
pricing.The breadth of tasks and competences regard-
ing administration and examination, decision,
enforcement and arbitration will then be summarised.
Institutional structures of NRAs
In all selected countries, NRAs were established as
independent institutions to foster the development
of expertise,free regulation from short-term political
pressure and provide stability for market partici-
pants. In nearly all selected countries, a clear distinc-
tion between the policy maker – in all cases a min-
istry – and the regulatory body exists. The only
exception is the FCC in the US, which also has poli-
cy-making powers.
An independent regulator needs reliable financial
sources, should not be accountable to the policy-
maker but to another “neutral” group which should
also receive the regulator’s reports. In the selected
countries, several types of NRA budget financing
can be observed: appropriation, fees and contribu-
tions from operators or a mix of these financing
forms. Appropriation might be influenced by politi-
cal change and could be less reliable than fees or
operator contributions.The independence of regula-
tors with fees or a mixed financing base may thus be
stronger than that of regulators relying only on
appropriation. Only two of the NRAs – in Australia
and France – rely only on appropriation (see
Table 3). Financing in Canada is exclusively fee-
based, whereas the other four selected countries
show mixed financing of their budget.
Accountability and reporting are not always
addressed to the same institution. In four of the
countries – France, Germany, the UK and the US –
they address the parliament; in France also the min-
istry and the government.In Canada reports have to
be addressed to ministries; accountability informa-
tion also to the parliament. Australia and Sweden
have reporting obligations to the ministry and
accountability to the government.
Political influence on the regulator might be exer-
cised through the staffing of the boards of regulators.
Here, too, a close relationship to the policy-maker
3 On the state level these functions are performed by public utility
commissions (PUC).might reduce independence, as long as no qualified
group has a right to recommendations for staffing
decisions.
As shown in Table 4, the nomination procedures in
Australia, France and Germany would seem to offer
the least possibilities of direct political influence,
whereas Sweden and the UK might have the highest.
This view is challenged by Dassler (2006). He distin-
guishes between substantive and proceduralist orien-
tations of European NRAs, where “substantive”
describes an approach favouring expertise and policy
consistency in staffing decisions and “proceduralist”
stands for an approach more oriented towards demo-
cratic control and accountability than expertise.
Based on these categories,he sees regulatory appoint-
ment, accountability and decision-making as predom-
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Table 3 
Reporting obligations, budget financing and accountability of national regulation authorities (NRA) 
Regulator Policy maker Reports to Budget financing Accountability
Australia ACMA Department of Com-
munications, Informa-




Canada CRTC Industry Canada Ministries Fees Ministry (Canadian
Heritage), Parliament



























USA FCC FCC; Department of
Commerce
Legislature Fees and appropria-
tion
Congress
Sources: OECD, (2006); Dassler and Parker, (2004); König, Kühling, Pieper, Schedl (2000).
Table 4 
Staffing and terms of NRA boards















Canada CRTC The Governor in
Council
Government 5 Yes 13 full time,
  6 part time
France ARCEP The President, the 
President of the
National Assembly
(1) and the President 










5Y e s 1
Sweden PTS The Government Ministry 6 Yes 9
United
Kingdom
Ofcom The Secretaries of
State
Ministry 3–5 Yes 9
USA FCC The President with
Senate confirmation
5Y e s 5
 Sources: OECD, (2006); Dassler and Parker (2004).CESifo DICE Report 3/2006 37
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inantly “proceduralist” in France and Germany. In
Sweden, appointment and accountability follow a
mixed approach with proceduralist and substantive
elements; decision-making is rated as expertise ori-
ented. The UK – according to Dassler – follows sub-
stantive notions in appointment and decision-making
and proceduralist notions in accountability.
With the exception of Canada, where the Governor
in Council can overturn an NRA decision, the deci-
sions cannot be overturned by the political level in
the other selected countries. Canada also allows for
ministerial guidance.
The division of regulatory responsibilities
Typically, the regulator is responsible for questions of
market entry,interconnection and pricing.The task of
competition control is either exclusively the domain
of competition authorities or a shared task between
competition authorities and regulators. Spectrum
allocation quite often implies ministries. A closer
look, though, shows quite different procedures.
Australia displays the strongest deviation from the
standard regulatory model in our sample. From the
beginning, the Australian model placed a strong
emphasis on industry self-regulation. Several bodies
– the Australian Communications Industry Forum
(ACIF), the Australian Communications Access
Forum (ACAF) and the Telecommunications
Industry Ombudsman (TIO), to name the three
most important – were created to resolve problems
without the intervention of a regulator or competi-
tion authority.The latter act only if self-regulation is
not able to solve a problem. Compared to the other
countries, the regulatory authority ACMA has only
very limited responsibilities in market entry (togeth-
er with the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, ACCC) and spectrum allocation. The
ACCC is responsible for competition control, inter-
connection and pricing. Thus, Australia has reduced
sector-specific regulation much more strongly than
other countries.
In Canada the industry ministry is responsible for
market entry in the mobile segment and spectrum
allocation. The regulator CRTC covers fixed entry4,
interconnection and pricing. Competition problems
are in the domain of the Competition Bureau.
In France, several consulting bodies may influence
regulation. Among the most important are the
Commission Supérieure du Service Public des Postes
et Télécommunications (CSSPPT), the Conseil
National des Postes et Télécommunications and the
Conseil Général des Technologies de l’Information.
The Conseil de la Concurrence (CC) is responsible
for questions regarding competition.
In Germany practically all decisions are made by the
NRA. The competition authority (Bundeskartell-
amt) has consulting functions in competition control.
The German NRA has the broadest responsibilities
in our sample.
The tasks of regulation in Sweden are, as in France,
allotted to the regulator PTS and the competition
authority Konkurrentcestyrelsen (KS). The regula-
tion of market entry in Sweden is quite liberalised,as
in Australia and Canada.
As in the US, the UK has concurring responsibilities
in competition control. In the UK, Ofcom and the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) share the authority to
identify dominant positions and to impose fines on
anticompetitive behaviour. The Competition
Commission has administrative and judicative func-
tions as an appeal tribunal in competition control.In
the US, competition control functions are shared
between FCC, the Department of Justice (DoJ,
Antitrust Division) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). The three agencies operate on
different legal bases: the FCC bases decisions on the
1996 Telecommunications Act, the DoJ on the
Sherman and Clayton Acts,the FTC on the FTC and
Clayton acts.The FCC and the PUCs can only decide
in cases where exemptions from antitrust clauses
exist,namely if prices are regulated or Section 271 of
the Telecommunications Act is applicable.
Regarding the intensity of regulation, Australia,
Canada, and Sweden can be counted among the
countries with low intensity.The UK and the US are
examples for a trend towards reduced regulation.
Germany and France can be seen as examples of
higher regulation intensity.
Summary
This article reports on recent developments in
telecommunication markets in selected OECD
countries with respect to technology, competition
4 For fixed entry, usually only registration is necessary; licenses are
only necessary for international communications and overseas
cables.and regulatory institution. Facilities-based competi-
tion can be seen as a major driver of durable and
effective competition in the total telecommunica-
tions market today,especially owing to technological
innovation.We describe the migration of subscribers
from the traditional public switched telecommunica-
tion network (PSTN) to new platforms, such as
broadband internet or mobile communication net-
works, offering substitutes for voice telecommunica-
tion services. The number of new access lines – or
facility-based entry – in the traditional access market
has only developed very slowly in the considered
countries. By contrast, competition in service provi-
sion, on the basis of carrier selection and pre-selec-
tion, has played an important role in the de-monop-
olisation of telecommunication markets, causing the
telephony prices to fall considerably in recent years.
Furthermore, the development of new technologies
such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has con-
tributed significantly to lower rates for businesses
and consumers.Nevertheless,using the development
of productivity, market shares, pricing and penetra-
tion as indicators for the level of competition to
compare the national markets with each other,some
substantial differences in market characteristics
could be demonstrated.
In this context, it proved necessary to take a closer
look at the regulatory framework of the respective
countries, which varies not only across OECD
countries, but also within the common regulatory
framework across the EU. Australia, on the one
hand, is an example where loose regulation or even
partial self-regulation of the industry has not pro-
duced favorable market conditions for competitors
and consumers.On the other hand,one cannot sim-
ply conclude that high regulation leads to the best
market results. Germany and France, as examples
of high regulatory intensity, are mostly in the mid-
field concerning the general market characteristics.
Countries like Sweden or the UK, however, have
succeeded in providing a good competitive market
environment without excessive (and hence costly)
regulation.
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